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Taller workers earn on average higher salaries. Recent research has proposed cognitive 
abilities and social skills as explanations for the height-wage premium. Another possible 
mechanism, employer discrimination, has found little support. In this paper, we provide some 
evidence in favor of the discrimination hypothesis. Using a cross section of 13 countries, we 
show that there is a consistent height-wage premium across Europe and that it is largely due 
to occupational sorting. We show that height has a significant effect for the occupational 
sorting of employed workers but not for the self-employed. We interpret this result as 
evidence of employer discrimination in favor of taller workers. Our results are consistent with 
the theoretical predictions of recent models on statistical discrimination and employer 
learning. 
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In the last few years, much scholarly research has been devoted to explain-
ing a striking empirical regularity in labor economics: Taller workers earn
more than shorter ones. The magnitude of the height-wage premium is not
trivial|one inch (about 2.54 cm) increase in height is associated with a wage
increase of about one to two percent (Case and Paxson, 2008). The exist-
ing literature has largely focused on cognitive abilities and social skills as
explanations for the height-wage premium (Case and Paxson, 2008; Persico,
Postlewaite, and Silverman, 2004). Another possible mechanism, namely
employer discrimination, has found little support. In fact, very few studies
relate the height-wage premium to a problem of statistical discrimination
(Loh, 1993; Magnusson, Rasmussen, and Gyllensten, 2006; H ubler, 2006).
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between height and labor market
outcomes using cross-section data for 13 European countries1 and provide
evidence in favor of the discrimination hypothesis.
We analyze data on older European workers from the rst two waves of
the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and show
that there is a substantial height-wage premium across Europe. Similarly to
the nding of Case, Paxson, and Islam (2008), our analysis suggests that
the height-wage premium is to a large extent due to sorting of taller workers
into higher status occupations. We also show that this result holds when we
control for cognitive abilities. More importantly, we assess whether employers
discriminate in favor of taller workers by comparing occupational sorting of
employed workers with that of the self-employed. A similar empirical strategy
was adopted by Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) who investigated whether
employer discrimination was the source of the wage premium associated with
beauty.
The logic behind this empirical approach is straightforward. We take two
otherwise similar groups which dier by the fact that the self-employed are
1 The height-wage premium has been mainly studied using data for Britain and the
U.S. (Case and Paxson, 2008; Case, Paxson, and Islam, 2008; Persico, Postlewaite, and
Silverman, 2004; Heineck, 2008). Exceptions are the studies of H ubler (2006) and Heineck
(2005, 2009) who analyze the height-wage premium for Germany.
2not subordinated to an employer. All other factors being constant, nding
a height eect for the employed workers occupational sorting, but not nd-
ing any height eect for the occupational sorting of the self-employed would
imply that employer discrimination plays a role in the employees' sorting.
Indeed, we nd that height plays a signicant role only in the occupational
sorting of employed workers, whereas it plays no role in the sorting of the
self-employed. This result suggests that employer discrimination contributes
to the height-wage premium and that body height belongs to those observ-
able characteristics used by employers to statistically discriminate between
workers.2 In addition, we also speculate that there is no full employer learn-
ing (Altonji and Pierret, 2001) as we nd that the height-wage premium is
still substantial for a relatively old age-group (as we shall explain below, our
data are for individuals mostly aged 50 and older).
Several potential channels and identication strategies have been put for-
ward in the literature to explain the height-wage premium. Studies in social
psychology stress factors such as self-esteem (Judge and Cable, 2004; Young
and French, 1996) and social dominance (Hensley, 1993). In particular, the
study of Judge and Cable (2004) elaborates on a theoretical model of phys-
ical stature and career success oering two possible explanations, namely
social-esteem and self-esteem, where the former is the positive evaluation
and regard of the society. They also stress that physical stature is more
likely to play a role in those occupations where social-interactions are more
important.
Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman (2004) exploit the intra-individual
variation of height between adolescence and adulthood in order to identify
at which stage of development physical stature determines the height-wage
premium. In particular, height for the same individual was measured at age 7,
11, 16 and 33. The authors nd that what matters for labor market outcomes
is not adult height but rather teen height. They argue that being tall at that
particular point of development is positively related with participation to
2 Generally, amount and quality of education, race, and gender are used to discriminate
between workers. See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a survey on labor market discrimina-
tion. See also Hamermesh and Biddle (1994); Hamermesh and Parker (2003); Hamermesh
(2006) on labor market returns to beauty and employer discrimination.
3social activities3 which enhance social skills that will be successively rewarded
in the labor market.
In a more recent paper, Case and Paxson (2008) stress the link between
height and intelligence. They show that already at age 3, and throughout
childhood, taller children have higher cognitive ability. They argue that
prenatal environment and nutrition during childhood might play an impor-
tant role in determining both physical stature and cognitive ability. They
conclude that taller workers earn more because they are more intelligent.
In a follow-up paper, using several waves of the British Household Panel
Survey, Case, Paxson, and Islam (2008) show that half of the height-wage
premium can be explained by the association between height and educational
attainment|consistent with the previous result that taller individuals have
higher cognitive ability|whereas half of the remaining premium is explained
by taller workers sorting into higher status occupations and industries. Case
and Paxson also acknowledge the possibility of statistical discrimination in
favor of taller workers \[...] at least until employers have time to learn about
employees abilities" (Case and Paxson, 2008, p. 529). In our paper, we shall
make a stronger case for employer discrimination as we show that discrim-
ination has a persistent eect observable until the end the workers' career
path.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the SHARE
data and the construction of our dataset, and we provide descriptive statis-
tics of the variables of interest. In section 3, we estimate the size of the
height-wage premium in Europe and show to which extent it is explained
by occupational sorting. In Section 4 we compare occupational sorting for
employed workers and self-employed in order to assess the role of employer
discrimination. We also provide some robustness checks and sensitivity anal-
ysis. Section 5 concludes.
3 The authors think of athletics, school clubs, and dating as examples of social activities.
42 Data
We use the rst two waves (2004/05 and 2006/07) of the Survey of Health,
Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which collects information on
earnings, health, and various socio-economic variables for individuals aged
50+ across 14 European countries.4 We use data for 13 countries as infor-
mation on Israel was not suitable for our analysis. Data on the sampled
respondent's partner were collected independently of age, therefore a few re-
spondents are younger than 50. We pool the entire wave 1 of the survey (year
2004/05) and the \refresher" sample of wave 2 (year 2006/07), so to have
a pooled sample in which we observe each individual once. The countries
used in our study represent dierent regions of Europe, namely Northern
Europe (Denmark and Sweden), Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland), Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, and
Spain), and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic and Poland).5 Since we are
interested in establishing the source of the height-wage premium, we initially
focus on respondents below age 65 who report having income from work.6
Physical stature is expected to start shrinking after the age of 50 (Tan-
ner, 1989). Yet, to the extent that the shrinking process is not systematically
dierent across countries (and there is no such evidence), it should not aect
the interpretation of our results. We exclude civil servants whose wage sched-
ule strongly depends on tenure (but our results do not change quantitatively
when we include civil servants as employed workers). Finally, in order to be
able to assess whether the height-wage premium is due to discrimination, we
focus exclusively on males as working women may be also subject to gender
discrimination.7 In Table 1, we show the number of observations we obtain
after imposing these restrictions (as well as availability of the dependent and
4 SHARE was designed in order to be comparable with the U.S. Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). For more details
about the dataset, see B orsch-Supan and J urges (2005). A recent cross-country study of
labor market outcomes that also uses SHARE data is Brunello, Fort, and Weber (2009).
5 Czech Republic and Poland were included only in wave 2 of the survey.
6 In the subsequent estimates of occupational sorting for self-employed, we relax the
restriction of having reported income from work.
7 Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman (2004) followed the same approach.
5independent variables which are discussed below). The country-specic num-
ber of observations ranges from a minimum of 121 in Austria to a maximum
of 588 in Sweden. The total number of observations is just under 4,200.
Regarding the dependent variable, we use information on gross earnings
reported by the respondent. Since respondents report also the actual number
of hours worked per week, we can compute hourly wages.8 In order to make
them comparable across countries, hourly wages are deated by OECD com-
parative price levels dened as the ratios of PPPs to exchange rates (OECD,
2008). It is also important to note that, in contrast to most other studies,
we can observe the exact date when the respondent started his last job (this
information is reected in the variable tenure).
Crucially for our analysis, the SHARE survey provides information on
self-reported height and weight, as well as numerous variables about the
health condition of the respondent. Since our main aim is to assess whether
employers discriminate according to height, we need to dene when an in-
dividual can be considered tall or short. In this sense, body height can be
viewed as a country-specic variable. Throughout the paper, if not other-
wise specied, we consider a person tall if his physical stature is above the
country-specic sample median.9 As shown in Table 2, the share of tall
employed workers is 55 percent whereas the share of tall self-employed in-
dividuals is slightly above 60 percent. In Figure 1 we show the relationship
between log hourly wage and height across Europe. With the only excep-
tion of Poland, employed workers whose stature is above the country-specic
median earn more than their shorter colleagues.
In order not to confound the eect of height with other physical appear-
ance eects, our subsequent analysis controls for obesity which is coded as a
dummy variable that takes the value of one for individuals with a body mass
index (BMI) of 30 or higher (which is the standard denition of obesity).10
8 We exclude from the regression analysis 23 observations with extreme values of the
dependent variable, such as hourly wages below one Euro and above one thousand Euros.
9 When we use height as a continuous variable, we obtain qualitatively similar results.
We decided to use a median split to facilitate the interpretation of the results.
10 The BMI of an individual is computed as the weight in kilograms, divided by the
square of height expressed in meters.
6Similarly to the study of De Luca, Mazzonna, and Peracchi (2009), which
also uses the SHARE data, we include controls for several types of chronic
diseases which could limit the respondent's earning capacities.11
Educational attainment is another variable that is country-specic. The
respondents' highest educational attainment has been made comparable across
countries using the ISCED-97 code. We then compute a binary variable for
high education which takes on value one if the respondent attained at least a
post-secondary education.12 Almost 30 percent of the workers in our sample
have attained a post-secondary education, whereas the share increases to 34
percent for the self-employed (Table 2). The richness of the dataset allows
us to include several controls for industry and occupation. In particular, we
insert controls for 14 industries following the NACE code (Version 4, Rev. 1,
1993) created by the European Union and 9 occupational categories following
the ISCO-88 code for the skill levels.13
The association between height and educational attainment is another
empirical regularity which has attracted much attention (Cinnirella, Piopiu-
nik, and Winter, 2009; Magnusson, Rasmussen, and Gyllensten, 2006; Lynn,
1989; Bielicki and Charzewski, 1983). Case, Paxson, and Islam (2008) nd
that half of the height-wage premium can be ascribed to the correlation be-
tween height and education. In Figure 2 we show the relationship between
height and educational attainment as in our sample. On average, respon-
dents with at least a post-secondary education are systematically taller than
those with a lower educational attainment.
The SHARE dataset is quite valuable as it also contains measures of
cognitive abilities. In particular, respondents perform tests on orientation
in time, memory, verbal uency, and numeracy.14 These tests for cognitive
11 These are high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, chronic lung
disease, and cancer.
12 In terms of the ISCED-97 code, the binary variable is one if the respondent falls in
category 4, 5, or 6.
13 The 14 industry categories are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, public utilities,
construction, trade, hotel, transportation, banking, real estate, public administration,
education, health, and other; the 9 occupational categories are manager, professionals,
technician, clerk, service, skilled agricultural worker, craft, blue-collar, and unskilled.
14 Respondents were also asked to rate subjectively their reading and writing skills.
7abilities are similar to those performed in HRS and ELSA. In the test of
orientation, the interviewed is asked about date and day of the week. Given
the low variance of the answers (at least in our sample of individuals who
are still working), we do not use this dimension of cognitive ability but focus
on the tests of memory, verbal uency, and numeracy.
In the memory test, respondents are asked to listen to a sequence of ten
items. Respondents have to recall the list immediately after listening and
then a second time after the uency and numeracy tests. We use the scores
of the delayed recall as they display a larger variance. In particular, we
compute a dummy variable for good memory which takes on value one if the
score is above the median. The test of verbal uency consists of listing in one
minute as many dierent names of animals as possible. For the regression
analysis we generate a dummy variable where the positive outcome indicates
individuals whose scores is above the median. In Figure 3 we show the
positive association between height and cognitive abilities, in particular the
relationship with the results of the word uency test and the memory test.
Numerical abilities were assessed by asking a sequence of questions of
dierent diculty. Respondents who answered correctly to the rst question
were asked a more dicult one, and in case of correct answer, they were asked
a third nal question. Those who failed the rst question were asked an easier
question. Thus, the best score would be to answer correctly to three questions
of increasing diculty, whereas respondents who scored worst were those who
failed the rst and the second question.15 We compute four dummy variables
which comprise the full spectrum of numeracy abilities revealed by the test.16
Among the employed workers, only 33 percent reached the maximum score
in numeracy; for the self-employed the share is equal to 36 percent (see Table
2).
15 The most dicult question is the following: \Let's say you have 2000 Euro in a saving
account. The account earns ten per cent interest each year. How much would you have
in the account at the end of the two years?" Possible answers are 2420, 2020, 2040, 2100,
2200, and 2400 Euros.
16 As already mentioned, respondents who failed to answer the rst question were asked
a second question of minor diculty. We ignore the performance on that second question
given the large number of correct answers.
83 The height-wage premium across Europe
The rst step of our empirical analysis is to assess existence and size of the
height-wage premium across the 13 European countries in our sample. We
estimate a standard Mincerian wage equation using a linear specication with
the logarithm of hourly wage, w, as dependent variable:
wi = xi + ui (1)
The (row) vector of explanatory variables, x, includes our variables of interest
(height and measures of cognitive ability), a constant, and additional control
variables. The vector  contains the coecients we estimate by OLS.17
In Table 3, we show four dierent specications in which we sequentially
introduce more controls. In the base specication (column 1) where we con-
trol only for country xed eects, taller workers earn around 8 percent more
than their shorter colleagues. As can be seen in the successive specications,
cognitive abilities in all three dimensions (numeracy, memory and verbal u-
ency) are strongly correlated with earnings. Most importantly, controlling for
cognitive abilities reduces the height-wage premium by about 30 percent.18
Yet, what practically reduces to zero the height-wage premium is the set of
occupational controls (column 4). In fact, although the point estimate of
the eect of height is still positive, the coecient is not statistically dierent
from zero. This result is similar to the nding of Case, Paxson, and Is-
lam (2008) whose study focused exclusively on Britain: They show that half
of the height-wage premium is explained by higher educational attainment,
whereas half of the remaining premium is explained by selection into higher
status occupations. It is also important to note that our model can explain
almost half of the variation in log hourly wage.
17 The error term u is not necessarily independent of all the elements of x, but as
discussed below, we are not interested in estimating causal eects; rather, we interpret the
estimated coecients as conditional correlations.
18 Clearly, cognitive abilities might be endogenous with respect to education and the
type of job performed. Since we are interested in the eect of height and not in the causal
eect of cognitive abilities, endogeneity is not a problem.
9These results clearly show that there is a consistent height-wage premium
across Europe and that this premium is largely explained by occupational
sorting. The relevant question at this point is: What is the mechanism that
generates occupational sorting by height? Can we exclude, as it was done
by the most recent literature, employer discrimination? The fact that taller
people select into higher status job does not necessarily exclude the existence
of labor market discrimination. In order to analyze whether there is employer
discrimination, in the next section we compare occupational sorting of em-
ployed workers with a sample of self-employed who, by denition, cannot be
subject to employer discrimination.
4 Occupational sorting
In this section, we aim to assess whether occupational sorting by height is
due to employer discrimination by comparing employed with self-employed
workers. The empirical strategy is as follows. We dene a categorical vari-
able, skill, which indicates the intellectual skills embedded in the dierent
occupations. We dene four skill categories (Table 4); `skill 1' is associated
with the highest intellectual skills, and `skill 4' with the lowest. This strategy
is inspired by the study of Case and Paxson (2006, p. 26{27) in which they
classied occupations according to the level of intellectual skills required fol-
lowing the Occupational Measures from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
for 1980 Census Detailed Occupations. Note that we aggregated the occupa-
tions in order to render the distribution of skills as similar as possible across
the two groups, employed and self-employed. Table 4 shows how the four
categories are distributed in the two groups. As one could have expected,
within the self-employed the category skill 1 is larger (46 percent) as it is
relatively more common to nd managers and professionals among the self-
employed. Nevertheless, circa 28 percent of employed workers fall within the
highest skill category. In a similar fashion, the group with the lowest skill
(skill 4) is larger for the employed workers. Notwithstanding the dierences,
10the distribution of skills across the two groups is fairly similar.19
Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, we estimate by
Maximum Likelihood a standard multinomial logit model which species the
response probabilities as






where yi denotes the skill level of an individual's job with j 2 f1:::;4g, xi is
the (row) vector of covariates, and j are the parameters to be estimated. In
the next subsection we present the estimates of occupational sorting models
for employed workers and self-employed and compare the eect of height,
assuming that the only dierence between the two groups is the absence of
an employer for the self-employed. Thus, if taller self-employed do not select
into higher status occupations, this would suggest that occupational sorting
by height among employed workers is driven by employer preference for taller
employees.20
4.1 Estimation results
We start by showing estimates of the occupational sorting model for em-
ployed workers. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimates, we
present the coecients as Relative Risk Ratios which can be interpreted as
the change in the probability of being in the indicated category with respect
to the reference category. In our case, the reference category is skill 3. The
results are presented in Table 5. As the log wage regression has already sug-
gested, height plays a major role in employees' occupational sorting: Being
taller than the country median increases the probabilities of being in cate-
gory 1 by about 65 percent compared to category 3 and by 31 percent for
19 In section 4.2 we shall conduct some formal tests in order to ensure that the employed
and self-employed are eectively similar in terms of their skill distribution.
20 H ubler (2006) analyzes the height-wage premium in Germany. Among various strate-
gies to assess whether employer discrimination plays a role, he also compares employees
with self-employed, though his dataset has only 170 observations for self-employed. In any
case, our strategy diers substantially from that of H ubler as we apply the comparison to
a model of occupational sorting and not to an earnings function.
11category 2. Cognitive abilities play also an important role and they show
the expected gradient: The higher the cognitive ability measure, the higher
is the probability of being in the most intellectual occupation. The same
interpretation holds for the coecients associated with high education.
In Table 6, we show the estimates for the self-employed. One should
immediately note that there is no height eect in the sorting model for the
self-employed. In fact, high education has the largest eect in explaining
sorting among the self-employed. Therefore, we nd that physical stature
has a signicant eect on occupational sorting only for employed workers,
whereas it plays absolutely no role for the self-employed. This comparative
analysis suggests that the occupational sorting by height we observe among
employed workers might be determined by the employers who, all other things
being constant, discriminate in favor of taller workers for jobs in which higher
intellectual skills are required.
Judge and Cable (2004) argue that height plays a larger role in occu-
pations where social interactions are more important. This point was also
stressed by Heineck (2008). If this were the case, we would nd a height eect
also in the occupational sorting model for the self-employed, as the category
with the highest intellectual skill comprises jobs such as \managers" and
\professional occupations" where social interactions are indeed important.
In this regard, in Table 7 we show the results of two Probit models where
we separately estimate the probability of being an employed or self-employed
professional.21 The share of professionals in the employed sample is about
14 percent, whereas the share of self-employed professionals is about 18 per-
cent. The estimates show that being taller than the country-specic median
increases signicantly (at the 10 percent level) the probability of being an
employed professional, whereas height has no eect for the self-employed pro-
fessionals. Therefore, also for the highest occupational category|which is
arguably highly comparable across employed and self-employed|height plays
a role only for the employed professionals. In the next subsection we shall
perform some formal tests in order to ensure that the two groups, employed
21 In these two regressions we are comparing, for instance, lawyers or tax-advisers who
are respectively employed or running their own business.
12and self-employed, are eectively similar in terms of their skills distribution.
4.2 Skill distributions of the employed and the self-
employed
The fact that height has an eect for the occupational sorting of employed
workers but not for the self-employed is used here as indicative evidence that
employers discriminate in favor of taller workers. One could claim that em-
ployed and self-employed should not be compared as there are unobserved
characteristics which are correlated with height and which dier systemat-
ically between the two groups. In fact, one could argue that the sample of
self-employed is not a random sample, but rather a selected sample of the
most (or less) skilled from the population. Yet, we can show that, at least for
what concerns the observable variables at our disposal, employed and self-
employed do not dier systematically with respect to their skill distribution.
Let us consider the employed (n = 494) and the self-employed profession-
als (n = 204) used in the regression of Table 7. We use a Mann-Whitney
test in order to assess whether, with respect to their cognitive abilities, the
two samples come from the same distribution.22 The null hypothesis is that
the two distributions are equal. Firstly, we can show that the height dis-
tributions of the two groups are statistically equal (Figure 4, graph in the
upper-left corner). The Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the null hypothesis
and a further test suggests that the two samples are drawn from populations
with the same median.
The graph in the upper-right corner of Figure 4 shows the distributions
of the word uency test for the two groups. One can see that the two distri-
butions are slightly dierent and that employed professionals have a higher
mode. Indeed, the test rejects the null hypothesis and suggests that the
distribution of the employed professionals has a higher median.
In the bottom-left corner we presents the distributions of the memory
test. In this case, the test cannot reject the null hypothesis and the test for
22 It is important to note that the Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test, which
means that it does not require assumptions about the form of the distribution of the
variables.
13the median suggests that the two samples come from populations with the
same median.
At last, in the bottom-right corner of Figure 4 we show the distributions
of the numeracy test. The statistical test cannot reject the null hypothesis,
which means that numerical abilities are distributed in the same way within
the two groups. In fact, the dataset contains also information on self-rated
reading and writing skills which go from \poor" to \excellent". In both
cases, the Matt-Whitney test cannot reject equality of the two distributions.
Therefore, employed and self-employed professionals seem to have dierent
skill distributions only with respect to word uency. In all other cases, namely
numeracy, memory, self-rated reading and writing skills, the two groups do
not show any signicant dierence.
These ndings validate our \identication strategy" which, besides the
large set of control variables at our disposal, is based on the fact that em-
ployed workers and self-employed dier uniquely by the fact that the latter
are not subject to an employer.23
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the expanding literature on the height-wage pre-
mium in several ways. First, we show that across Europe there exists a con-
sistent height-wage premium which can be largely ascribed to occupational
sorting and only partially to the positive association between height and
cognitive abilities. An employed worker whose height is above the country-
specic median has a probability of being in a high-skill occupation that is
about 65 percent higher than that of a worker employed in a low-skill occu-
pation. The main question we address in the paper is why taller workers,
independently of their education and cognitive abilities, perform intellectu-
ally more demanding jobs and therefore are better paid.
In order to understand whether employed workers are discriminated on
23 In fact, recent research suggests that the intergenerational link in self-employment is
not primarily due to the acquisition of specic business human capital (Fairlie and Robb,
2007)
14the basis of their body height, we perform a comparative analysis. We con-
sider a sample of self-employed individuals which is, in terms of skill distri-
bution, as much similar as possible to the group of employed workers. The
major dierence between the two groups is that the self-employed, by def-
inition, are not subordinated to an employer. We nd that, in contrast to
the case of the employed workers, height plays no role in occupational sort-
ing for the self-employed. This result holds even when we exclusively focus
on employed and self-employed professionals. We claim that these ndings
provide some compelling evidence in favor of the discrimination hypothesis.
These results are even more remarkable given the relatively advanced age
(50+) of the individuals in the SHARE dataset. It is reasonable to assume
that the asymmetry of information about workers' productivity, which is the
standard explanation for statistical discrimination, is not a major issue in
our sample in which most of the respondents should have already revealed
their productivity. Thus, we suggest three non-exclusive explanations for the
occupational sorting by height found for the employed workers: (i) employ-
ers, independently of the observable workers' productivity, have an a priori
strong preference for taller workers; (ii) short (prospective) workers on av-
erage do not apply for jobs where higher intellectual skills are required; (iii)
short workers are statistically discriminated at the beginning of their career
when they enter the labor market and, due to labor market rigidities, the
initial eect of discrimination persists until the end of the workers' career
path. In fact, there is some evidence that occupational sorting by height
is more pronounced in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, and Spain) where
internal labor markets are allegedly more rigid and ring costs are relatively
higher (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 736).24 This evidence, if conrmed,
would support the hypothesis that there is statistical discrimination at the
beginning of the career path when entering the labor market and that dis-
crimination, despite employer learning, is more persistent where labor market
are more rigid.
Our ndings on employer discrimination are consistent with the theoret-
ical framework provided by Altonji (2005). The author develops a model in
24 Estimates are available upon request.
15which employers learn about the workers' skill at a rate which is assumed
to depend on the skill level of the job.25 The model predicts that high-
skill individuals with observable characteristics that are associated with low
skill|in our case it would be short physical stature|will tend to be trapped
for some time in low-skill jobs. In addition, if the employers' belief on the
worker productivity is low enough due to statistical discrimination,26 the
worker is unlikely to reach the most skill-intensive positions in the economy
(Altonji, 2005, p. 115). Indeed, we nd that shorter employed workers are
systematically less likely to hold a high-skilled position, independently of
their education and cognitive abilities.
25 Contrary to the model of Lange (2007), in which the employer learns quickly about
workers' productivity but only if workers acquire further education, in the model of Altonji
(2005) employers' initial estimate of productivity inuences wage growth independently of
workers' training.
26 Altonji refers to statistical discrimination on the basis of educational credentials,
family background, race and/or ethnicity.
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Source: SHARE, wave 1 and 2.
20Table 2: Summary statistics
Employed Self-employed
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Hourly wage 20.42 33.64
Age 55.38 4.11 56.34 4.37
High education 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47
Tenure (years) 19.64 13.27 21.72 11.87
Height in cm 176.74 7.18 176.36 7.02
Tall (share) 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49
Obesity 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Numeracy level 1 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23
Numeracy level 2 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42
Numeracy level 3 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48
Numeracy level 4 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48
Good memory 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49
Good uency 0.68 0.47 0.58 0.49
Observations 3058 1139
Note: High education indicates individuals with at least a post-secondary edu-
cation (ISCED code 4, 5, or 6). Tall indicates individuals measuring above the
country-specic median. Obesity indicates individuals with BMI  30. About
numeracy, memory and word uency, see text.
Source: SHARE, wave 1 and 2.
21Table 3: The eect of height on earnings
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tall 0.082*** 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Age -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High education 0.305*** 0.256*** 0.250*** 0.139***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Tenure 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.053**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Obesity -0.029 -0.033 -0.034 -0.035
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Numeracy level 2 0.026 0.029 0.021
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Numeracy level 3 0.088*** 0.086** 0.060*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Numeracy level 4 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.107***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Good memory 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.072***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Good uency 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.045**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 2.322*** 2.062*** 1.917*** 1.977***
(0.182) (0.185) (0.204) (0.204)
Health controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls No No Yes Yes
Occupation controls No No No Yes
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3058 3058 3058 3058
R-squared 0.408 0.424 0.435 0.467
Note: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Tall indicates individuals measuring above the country-specic median.
High education indicates individuals with at least a post-secondary education
(ISCED code 4, 5, or 6). Obesity indicates individuals with BMI  30.
About numeracy, memory and word uency, see text.
22Table 4: Distribution of skills among employed and self-employed
Skill Level Employed Self-employed
Skill 1 (Manager, Professional) 963 527
(27.9) (46.3)
Skill 2 (Technician) 647 148
(18.8) (13.0)
Skill 3 (Service, Crafts, Blue-collar) 1,510 437
(44.0) (38.4)
Skill 4 (Unskilled) 320 27
(9.3) (2.4)
Total 3440 1139
Note: Occupational Measures from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for 1980
Census Detailed Occupations. See Case and Paxson (2006, p. 26{27).
23Table 5: The eect of height on employed occupational sorting
Employed
Dependent variable: Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 4
Tall 1.648*** 1.312*** 0.855
(0.178) (0.138) (0.114)
Age 1.007 1.010 1.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
High education 9.213*** 3.403*** 0.748
(1.145) (0.450) (0.170)
Tenure 1.010** 1.019*** 0.971***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Married 1.548*** 1.381** 0.991
(0.228) (0.197) (0.172)
Obesity 0.976 0.942 0.832
(0.147) (0.134) (0.148)
Numeracy level 2 1.336 1.552* 0.997
(0.338) (0.360) (0.204)
Numeracy level 3 2.059*** 2.122*** 0.848
(0.503) (0.479) (0.176)
Numeracy level 4 3.451*** 2.684*** 0.759
(0.854) (0.628) (0.182)
Good memory 1.359*** 1.389*** 0.705**
(0.158) (0.155) (0.096)
Good uency 1.774*** 1.661*** 0.760*
(0.223) (0.197) (0.107)
Health controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Country controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3440
Pseudo R-squared 0.219
Note: Multinomial logit model: Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) reported. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The base category is Skill 3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Tall indicates individuals measuring above the country-specic me-
dian. High education indicates individuals with at least a post-secondary education
(ISCED code 4, 5, or 6). Obesity indicates individuals with BMI  30. About
numeracy, memory and word uency, see text.
24Table 6: The eect of height on self-employed occupational sorting
Self-employed
Dependent variable: Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 4
Tall 1.064 1.165 0.603
(0.160) (0.253) (0.257)
Age 1.011 1.019 0.921
(0.018) (0.025) (0.050)
High education 4.931*** 3.000*** 1.783
(0.858) (0.709) (0.991)
Tenure 0.985** 0.965*** 0.946***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.018)
Married 0.738 0.847 0.481
(0.154) (0.241) (0.257)
Obesity 0.819 0.930 1.322
(0.166) (0.285) (0.689)
Numeracy level 2 1.264 2.543 1.665
(0.402) (1.504) (1.426)
Numeracy level 3 1.111 2.132 1.752
(0.340) (1.225) (1.475)
Numeracy level 4 1.804* 3.558** 0.578
(0.564) (2.052) (0.573)
Good memory 1.166 1.545* 0.914
(0.177) (0.347) (0.392)
Good uency 0.952 0.610** 0.405*
(0.155) (0.144) (0.198)
Health controls Yes Yes Yes
Country controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1139
Pseudo R-squared 0.136
Note: Multinomial logit model: Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) reported. Standard
errors in parentheses. The base category is Skill 3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Tall indicates individuals measuring above the country-specic median.
High education indicates individuals with at least a post-secondary education
(ISCED code 4, 5, or 6). Obesity indicates individuals with BMI  30. About
numeracy, memory and word uency, see text.
















Numeracy level 2 0.187 -0.056
(0.162) (0.285)
Numeracy level 3 0.357** 0.184
(0.158) (0.269)
Numeracy level 4 0.517*** 0.283
(0.158) (0.269)
Good memory 0.029 0.184*
(0.069) (0.112)




Health controls Yes Yes
Country controls Yes Yes
Observations 3440 1139
Pseudo R-squared 0.226 0.257
Note: Probit model, standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Tall indicates individuals measuring above the country-specic median.
High education indicates individuals with at least a post-secondary education
(ISCED code 4, 5, or 6). Obesity indicates individuals with BMI  30. About
numeracy, memory and word uency, see text.
26Figure 1: Log hourly wage and height by country
Note: Employed workers who reported an income from work. Tall (short) indicates
individuals measuring above (below) the country-specic median.
Source: SHARE, wave 1 and 2.
27Figure 2: Height and education by country
Note: Employed and self-employed. High (low) education indicates individuals
having (not having) attained at least a post-secondary education (ISCED code 4,
5, or 6).
Source: SHARE, wave 1 and 2.
28Figure 3: Cognitive functions and height
Note: Employed and self-employed. Data points are tted with a second order
polynomial Kernel function. The bands show a 95 percent condence interval.
Source: SHARE, wave 1 and 2.
29Figure 4: Distributions of height and cognitive functions for employed and
self-employed professionals
Source: SHARE, wave 1 and 2.
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